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LAW'S COMPLEXITY: A PRIMER
J.B. Ruhl*
INTRODUCTION
The legal system. It rolls easily off the tongues of lawyers like a
single word-thelegalsystem-as if we all know what it means. But
what is the legal system? How does it behave? What are its
boundaries? What is its input and output? How will it look in one
year? In ten years? How should we use it to make change in some
other aspect of social life?
These are foundational questions; yet, of the tens of thousands of
references to "the legal system" in legal literature,' few of the authors
say anything about it as a system. To be sure, questions about the
nature of law and legal systems have occupied jurisprudential
investigations for centuries, but even in this subset of the literature
little attention is given to the system half of "the legal system."2 After
centuries of building and thinking about our legal system, we still do
not have ready answers for such questions of the first order.
One thing over which many authors seem to agree, however, is that
there is something "complex" about the legal system, using the two
terms in close proximity as if to impart some deeper understanding.
3
So, for example, one author suggests that "no complex legal system
can provide clear textual answers to every issue or dispute that falls
* Visiting Professor (Spring 2008), Harvard Law School; Matthews & Hawkins Professor of
Property, The Florida State University College of Law, Tallahassee, Florida. I am thankful to the
Georgia State University Law Review and GSU Professor Gregory Jones for organizing the symposium
on Dynamical Jurisprudence: Law as a Complex System and inviting me to participate, and to Vicki
Shiah, HLS class of 2009, for research assistance.
I. A January 9, 2008, search of Westlaw's TP-ALL library for "legal system' yielded 80,962
documents.
2. For a summary of some of the literature on law as a system see J.B. RuhI, The Fitness of Law:
Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and its Practical Meaning for
Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1407 (1996).
3. A January 9, 2008, search of Westlaw's TP-ALL library for "legal system" Is complex! yielded
2,312 documents, and a search for "complex legal system" yielded 226 documents.
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within its scope as time goes by,",4 and another claims that intellectual
property rights law "has radically evolved since the nineteenth
century when there was no structure, to the present where there are
complex legal systems and rules in place." 5 One author even goes so
far as to refer to "massively complex legal systems," suggesting that
they "require a great deal of constituting." 6 I have no doubt that these
propositions are accurate. Beyond conjoining "complex" and "legal
system," however, these works and many others like them venture no
further into what makes the legal system complex.
Perhaps it is so obvious that the legal system (whatever it is) is
complex (whatever that means) that one need say no more about its
complexity-it's complex, so there you have it, and that means
Proposition X is true. But when one claims that Proposition X
follows from the fact that the legal system is complex, in that it will
not always provide clear answers, or it requires a great deal of
constituting, or it is more complex now than it was a few centuries
ago, one necessarily must develop or adopt a theory of what
complexity is, otherwise how can we conclude that it is complexity
that leads to the truth of the proposition? It cannot suffice to respond
simply that the legal system is complicated, or has a lot of parts, or is
hard to predict, for those are merely observations-all true I would
add-about the consequences of its complexity. What is it, exactly,
that makes the legal system complicated, with many parts, and hard
to predict? Would not knowing the answer to that question help us
better understand the legal system and how to design and employ it
for the general welfare of society?
To put it another way, would assembling a cogent, descriptively
accurate theory of what makes the legal system complex help us to
formulate more accurate and useful propositions about the legal
4. Andrew D. Mitchell, The Legal Basis for Using Principles in WTO Disputes, 10 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 795, 795 (2007).
5. Christopher B. Conley, Comment, Parallel Imports: The Tired Debate of the Exhaustion of
Intellectual Property Rights and Why the WTO Should Harmonize the Haphazard Laws of the
International Community, 16 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 189, 210 (2007).
6. Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 417 (2007)
(emphasis added).
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system? I have to believe it would, and in my pursuit of such an
explanation I have leaned heavily on the theory of complex adaptive
systems-the study of systems comprised of a macroscopic,
heterogeneous set of autonomous agents interacting and adapting in
response to one another and to external environment inputs.7
Emerging primarily from the physical sciences in the 1980s, complex
adaptive systems theory has spread to economics, ecology,
9
sociology, 10 and beyond. Along with a growing number of legal
scholars," I am working to import the theory into the study of legal
systems.
When we talk of using complex adaptive systems theory to inform
legal theory, we can think of it as applying on one or more of several
levels of contextual depth. At the surface, one might recognize that
there are complex adaptive system properties in the economy,
poverty, war, terrorism, crime, the environment, and other realms we
attempt to manage and regulate through law, and ask simply what
that means for law. How should law be configured so as to best
approach these complex social and physical systems? At a deeper
level, one might ask whether law itself is a complex adaptive system.
Why, for example, if the economy and other social systems exhibit
7. There is no universally applied definition for complex adaptive systems. A good working
definition is "macroscopic collections of simple (and typically nonlinearly) interacting units that are
endowed with the ability to evolve and adapt to a changing environment." European Commission,
Complexity in Social Science Research Project, COSI - Glossary,
http://www.irit.fr/COSI/glossary/fulllist.php?letter=C (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
8. See ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH: EVOLUTION, COMPLEXITY, AND THE
RADICAL REMAKING OF ECONOMICS (2006); Robert M. May et al., Ecology for Bankers, 451 NATURE
893 (2008).
9. See SIMON LEVIN, FRAGILE DOMINION: COMPLEXITY AND THE COMMONS (1999).
10. See JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE (2007); R. KEITH SAWYER, SOCIAL EMERGENCE: SOCIETIES
AS COMPLEX SYSTEMS (2005).
11. A January 9, 2008, search of Westlaw's TP-ALL library for "complex adaptive system" yielded
168 documents. Not all of the entries substantively discuss complex adaptive systems theory to inform
legal theory or the design and application of law. The prize for mentioning "complex adaptive system"
and "complex legal system" in the same document at the time of my search goes to just two authors. See
Bernard Trujillo, Patterns in a Complex System: An Empirical Study of Valuation in Business
Bankruptcy Cases, 53 UCLA L. REV. 357 (2005); Julian Webb, Law, Ethics, and Complexity:
Complexity Theory and the Normative Reconstruction of Law, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 227 (2005). Of
course, after this publication there will be at least three.
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complex adaptive system properties, the legal system would not?
That does not seem plausible. To push further, if the economy and the
legal system are both complex adaptive systems, then one would also
expect the two systems to interact complexly with each other, as well
as with all the other complex social and physical systems with which
they are interconnected. And if law complexly affects the economy
and other systems, and the economy and other systems complexly
affect law, the distinct probability is that law affects itself complexly.
At its deepest level, therefore, complex adaptive systems theory as
applied to the legal system presents a rich and dynamic field of study.
It asks whether the targets of law are complex adaptive systems, and
if so what that means for law's design. It asks whether law itself,
however we define its boundaries, is also a complex adaptive system,
and if so what that means for law's design. And it asks how law and
its regulatory targets co-evolve and what that means for law's design.
This article orients those three questions within the context of
complex adaptive systems theory. Part I provides a short primer on
complex adaptive systems theory and suggests ways of usefully
mapping it onto the legal system to expand our understanding of its
behavior and properties. To make the case for the practical utility
complex adaptive systems theory has for law, Part II explores a few
of the major implications the theoretical foundation has for
institutional and instrument design issues in law. I close by offering
suggestions for next steps in the development of the theory of law's
complexity.
There is a legal system, and it is complex and adaptive. We can
leave it at that and intuit propositions that seem likely to follow, or
we can dive headfirst into law's complexity to swim amidst its chaos,
its feedback networks, its self-organization, its scales, its emergence,
and its sheer dynamism. For those who have already taken that dive, I
hope this work serves as a useful status check and blueprint for
further work. For those who have not taken the dive, I hope this will
persuade you to join us, or at least to dip your big toe into the
whirlpool of law's complexity.
[Vol. 24:4
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I. THINKING OF LAW AS A COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM
There would be no point to exploring a model of law as a complex
adaptive system if doing so would not open up windows to new
understanding of law as a system. Complex adaptive systems theory
studies how agents interact and the aggregate product of their
interactions. But the study of law already abounds with such theories.
Game theory, for example, focuses on actors in bilateral strategic
interactions. 12 More generally, interaction models based on law and
economics study market-level efficiencies by projecting interactions
between multitudes of "rational actors" that represent the averaged-
out behavioral traits of the infinite masses. 13 The problem, as Miller
and Page point out, is that "most economic, political, and social
interactions involve moderate numbers of people."'14 They elaborate:
Most social science models require either very few (typically
two) or very many (often an infinity) agents to be tractable.
When an agent interacts with only a few other agents, we can
usually trace all of the potential actions and reactions. When an
agent faces an infinity of other agents, we can average out... the
behavior of the masses and again find ourselves back in a world
that can easily be traced. It is in between these two extremes-
when an agent interacts with a moderate number of others-that
our traditional analytic tools break down. 5
Most actors in the legal system interact in this moderate numbers
context in which there are too many interacting agents to fit neatly
into bilateral models, but not enough agents to ignore idiosyncratic
behavior by averaging-out to an infinite numbers "rational actor"
model. Appellate lawyers, for example, know there is a limited pool
12. See Martin Shubik, Game Theory, Complexity, and Simplicity Part 11: Problems and
Applications, 3(3) COMPLEXrrY 36, 37 (1998) (describing game theory's impact in mathematics,
science, philosophy, and policy advocacy).
13. See BEINHOCKER, supra note 8, at 3-71; MILLER & PAGE, supra note 10, at 4-5.
14. MILLER & PAGE, supra note 10, at 221.
15. Id.
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of judges who might wind up on a panel, and that the judges have
different judicial persona. No competent lawyer would draft an
appellate brief to align with a particular panel composition without
knowing those are in fact the judges on the panel, nor would the
lawyer draft a brief based on a panel composed of "average judges" if
the lawyer knew who the judges on the panel are. Throughout the
legal system, agents interact in ways suggesting that the differences
between agents matter, because they do. Complex adaptive systems
theory is about building models for moderate number contexts in
which agent heterogeneity can and usually does influence outcomes,
and as such it is worth exploring how it might inform our
understanding of the legal system.
A. What Is a Complex Adaptive System?
The term "complex adaptive system" implies two relatively
unremarkable properties-adaptation and a system-and a third
property that is at the heart of the theory-complexity. Starting with a
single agent sitting inert all by itself, we move to a system where two
or more agents interact, and they interact adaptively if they use
"if/then" responses to chart their respective moves. Game theory's
two-player prisoner's dilemma is such a system.16 Although bilateral
adaptive system models are rather simple, multi-agent adaptive
systems can grow large in size, diverse in types of agents, and
extensive in different "if/then" rules of adaptation, but that alone
might not make them more than complicated. Complicatedness and
complexity are not the same.
For example, few would dispute that the legal system is
complicated-in the United States one must study law three years
just to have the privilege of taking the bar exam! And law is only one
of many social worlds in that respect. But the "very basic question we
must consider is how complex, versus complicated, are social
16. See generally Shubik, supra note 12.
[Vol 24:4
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worlds."'1 7 The distinction goes to the essence of complex adaptive
systems theory.
In a complicated world, the various elements that make up the
system maintain a degree of independence from one another.
Thus, removing one such element (which reduces the level of
complication) does not fundamentally alter the system's behavior
apart from that which directly resulted from the piece that was
removed. Complexity arises when the dependencies among the
elements become important. In such a system, removing one
such element destroys system behavior to an extent that goes
well beyond what is embodied by the particular element that is
removed. 18
Complex adaptive systems theory studies these inter-agent
dependencies and the system-wide effects they produce. While there
is no universally agreed upon metric for determining what it takes to
move an adaptive system to a complex adaptive system and for
measuring the degree of complexity, 19 the theoretical model has come
to rest on a collection of agent and system properties that are at the
core of complexity. Ecosystems provide a useful medium for
explication of these properties.
Preeminent biologist Simon Levin has described ecosystems as the
"prototypical examples of complex adaptive systems. 2 ° John
Holland, one of the leading figures in complex adaptive systems
research, has explained why:
Ecosystems are continually in flux and exhibit a wonderful
panoply of interactions such as mutualism, parasitism, biological
17. MILLER & PAGE, supra note 10, at 27.
18. Id. at 9. Thus "work is needed on distinguishing the complex ... from the just complicated in the
presence of many possible explanatory models and imperfect data. Nicholas W. Watkins and Marvyn P.
Freeman, Natural Complexity, 320 SCIENCE 323, 333 (2008).
19. See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 10, at 188-89.
20. Simon Levin, Ecosystems and the Biosphere as Complex Adaptive Systems, 1 ECOSYSTEMS 431,
431 (1998) (emphasis removed).
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arms races, and mimicry.. --Matter, energy, and information are
shunted around in complex cycles ... [and] the whole is more
than the sum of its parts. Even when we have a catalogue of the
activities of most of the participating species, we are far from
understanding the effect of changes in the ecosystem.2'
These broad agent and system behavior properties can be unpacked
into several essentials. Starting with agent interactions, the
foundation of an ecosystem is agent heterogeneity. Known as
biodiversity in ecology, variety in the assembly of species is an
important driver in how complexly the species interact. 22 Yet,
although different assemblies would lead to different sets of
interactions, underlying all species interactions are deterministic rules
of chemistry, biology, and physics.23 As in all complex adaptive
systems, complex ecosystem behavior can arise from fairly simple
rules of nature. What makes the interactions complex is how the
rules, when set in motion among the diverse species and physical
attributes of an ecosystem, produce nonlinear relationships between
different agents and attributes. Some of the earliest work on
nonlinearity in complex adaptive systems, for example, studied
relationships between predator and prey, such as the lynx and the
hare, which exhibit frequent explosions and crashes in populations. 24
Of course, the lynx and the hare interact within the larger
ecosystem, responding to far more than each other. The assembly of
species and physical attributes builds network connectivity through
which flows of energy and information link all the species to all
21. JOHN HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: How ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXITY 3 (1995). A similar
account explains that "ecological communities are among the most complex entities studied by
scientists, as they are composed of thousands of species with many distinct lifestyles, interacting in a
myriad of ways. Understanding the relationship between the complexity and diversity of ecological
systems, and their stability and persistence, is the perennial challenge in ecology." Robert D. Holt,
Asymmetry and Stability, 442 NATURE 252, 252 (2006).
22. See Levin, supra note 20, at 433 (discussing the importance of genetic, species, and ecosystem
diversity).
23. See id. ("[A]II ecosystems are complex adaptive systems, governed by similar thermodynamic
principles and local selection.").
24. See HOLLAND, supra note 21, at 16-18 (explaining why there is no proportionate relationship
between the numbers and trends of the interacting lynx and hare populations).
[Vol. 24:4
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others in direct or indirect causal relationships. 25 Many of those ties
may seem attenuated, but any of the ties could play a significant role
in regulating ecosystem properties. For example, simply replacing
"sit and wait" spiders with "active hunting" spiders in a grassland
ecosystem can lead to dramatic changes in vegetation patterns.26
Spiders, of course, do not eat plants, so how can the type of spider
affect the pattern of vegetation? The answer involves grasshoppers,
which do eat plants, but which also must adjust their survival
behavior based on spider predator tactics. The chain of effects
followed the network of connectivity between species: changing the
spider predator tactic altered grasshopper feeding strategy, which in
turn altered the vegetation pattern. The key move in this chain is the
feedback grasshoppers receive when they test strategies for avoiding
spiders while feeding on plants. 27 What worked in response to sit and
wait spiders might be disastrous for avoiding active hunting spiders,
and the grasshoppers better adjust accordingly. The architecture of
the agent network causal connections thus lies at the core of what
happens in an ecosystem. Change the network architecture, and you
very likely have set in motion adaptive feedback changes throughout
the ecosystem. The system is not just complex-it is complex and
adaptive.
The spider-grasshopper-vegetation network is but one of a
multitude of such causal chains in a grassland ecosystem. What we
identify and study as the grassland ecosystem, is, in fact, the
emergence of landscape scale phenomena from the aggregation and
25. See Levin, supra note 20, at 433 ("[F]Iows ... provide the interconnections between parts, and
transform the community from a random collection of species into an integrated whole, an ecosystem in
which biotic and abiotic parts are interrelated."). The study of social system networks thus is a critical
component of complex adaptive systems theory. See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 10, at 154-65.
Although social network theory has been developing for decades, vastly improved statistical methods
and computational power have made it possible to model extremely complex social networks based on
complex adaptive systems theory. See Karen Heyman, Making Connections, 313 SCIENCE 604 (2006);
D.R. White, Networks and Complexity: Converging Streams of Research, 8(1) COMPLEXITY 14 (2003).
26. See Oswald J. Schmitz, Effects of Predator Hunting Mode on Grassland Ecosystem Function,
319 SCIENCE 952 (2008).
27. See Levin, supra note 20, at 434 ("[T]ight linkages between ... interacting species provide
reliable and rapid feedbacks for individual behaviors.").
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interaction of network causal chains operating in the field.28 Put a
collection of species on the landscape, give them time to adjust to
their environment and each other, and what emerges is what we call
an ecosystem. We call it an ecosystem because we need a word to
capture the holistic set of landscape-level properties that the species
assembly produces. The important aspect of emergence in complex
adaptive systems is that it cannot be understood through reductionist
methods-i.e., by examining the parts of the ecosystem underlying its
operation one at a time.29 If one were to study just spiders, just
grasshoppers, or just plants, one would not likely make the
connections made in the research that studied them interacting all
together. So, although studying each part of an ecosystem is
important work, at some point the only way to understand the
ecosystem is to study it at the landscape scale.
It is when we make the move from studying agents to studying
systems that the particular attributes of complex adaptive systems
become prominent. As the spider-grasshopper-vegetation research
illustrates, the particular assembly of species drives the ecosystem,
and changing the assembly can steer it in a different direction. If
active hunting spiders make it to an area first, their hunting tactics
may send the area into a pattern that over time makes it difficult for
sit and wait spiders to infiltrate, which "locks in" the pattern even
more strongly. This path dependence property means that the future
of the ecosystem depends on the past, and events of the past limit the
28. Emergence has been defined as "complicated global patterns emerging from local or individual
interaction rules between parts of a system." P. M. Binder, Frustration in Complexity, 320 SCIENCE 322,
322 (2008). Because emergent properties are the system-wide product of many such local interaction
rules, it is not possible to describe emergent properties simply by describing the interaction rules.
Emergence thus is "a process that leads to the appearance of structure not directly described by the
defining constraints and instantaneous forces that control a system." James P. Crutchfied, Is Anything
Ever New? Considering Emergence, in COMPLEXITY: METAPHORS, MODELS, AND REALITY 515, 516
(George A. Cowan et al. eds., 1994). For a sweeping discussion of emergence in social and natural
systems, see Peter A. Coming, The Reemergence of "Emergence": A Venerable Concept in Search of a
Theory, 7(6) COMPLEXITY 18 (2002).
29. See ROBERT G. BAILEY, ECOSYSTEM GEOGRAPHY 16 (1996) ("[W]e cannot understand
ecosystems by only considering their separate components.").
JVol. 24:4
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range of possible events for the future.3 0 Over time, network
architecture builds along the path of the system, laying a foundation
of self-organized structure that lends stability to the ecosystem within
its environment of exogenous conditions.
31
On the other hand, the diversity of species, their nonlinear
relationships, and the network connectivity of feedback between
them mean that change is constantly happening within the ecosystem.
The active hunting spiders may be "locked in" for now, but if the sit
and wait spiders are better able to withstand a severe winter, they
may be able to take over the next spring, thus setting in motion a new
regime. When we peer into the ecosystem, we see change like this
constantly occurring, but on the landscape level, we still see a stable
grassland ecosystem. This critical state of "stable disequilibrium" is a
hallmark of complex adaptive systems.
32
Change within an ecosystem is constant and built into the critical
state of dynamic behavior, but it is not uniform in frequency or
magnitude. Rather, most change in ecosystems is relatively minor,
such as annual dry seasons, with only the occasional severe change,
such as a drought of record. The distribution of change events in
complex adaptive systems thus does not exhibit normal bell-shaped
curve properties. Instead, we almost invariably find change occurring
in power law event distributions in which vast numbers of small
changes are punctuated by infrequent large changes. 33 Complex
adaptive systems build adaptive capacity based on this kind of
change regime, not based on a normal distribution. An ecosystem, for
example, builds resistance capacity to withstand environmental
30. See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 10, at 216 ("[A]gents [in a complex adaptive system] find
themselves in a path-dependent world, in which early choices determine future possibilities."). Path
dependence is evident in the way species assemble in an ecosystem. See Levin, supra note 20, at 433.
31. See Levin, supra note 20, at 433 ("The ontogeny of an ecosystem represents a particular form of
evolution . . . [in which] flows become modified, and the system assumes shape through a process of
self-organization.").
32. Thus self-organized criticality is "a generic pattern of self-organized non-equilibrium behavior in
which there are characteristic long-range temporal and spatial regularities." PETER COVENEY & ROGER
HIGHFIELD, FRONTIERS OF COMPLEXITY: THE SEARCH FOR ORDER IN A CHAOTIC WORLD 432 (1995).
33. See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 10, at 165-77.
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changes such as fire regimes, and builds resilience capacity to
rebound from severe incidents.
34
Notwithstanding the remarkable capacity of complex adaptive
systems to maintain their properties over time, we must return to the
cold, hard truth that all systems ultimately are built on deterministic
rules that cannot be violated. There is a limit to the resistance and
resilience of any complex adaptive system, and if pushed hard
enough or persistently enough, a system might move into a phase
transition through which a radically new network architecture is
installed. Moreover, just as nonlinear relationships define agent
interaction, the system phase transition may occur as a sharp
discontinuity "tipping point" and the new regime may "lock in"
through path dependent effects. Many ecologists fear that climate
change, for example, may be the agent of phase transitions in
ecosystems around the globe, and that these transitions may be
irreversible.
36
B. Law's Complexity
I have used ecosystems to describe the building blocks of complex
adaptive systems theory because the proposition that ecosystems are
complex adaptive systems is entirely noncontroversial. Making the
jump from physical and biological systems to social systems has seen
controversy for the obvious reason that humans are the intentional
34. See C.S. Holling & Lance H. Gunderson, Resilience and Adaptive Cycles, in PANARCHY:
UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATION IN HUMAN AND NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 25-62 (Lance H.
Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds. 2002).
35. See Levin, supra note 20, at 433 (discussing "the potential for threshold behavior and qualitative
shifts in system dynamics under changing environmental influences").
36. Consider, for example, the effect of rising temperatures in tundra regions, where permafrost
conditions have been maintained for centuries, once methane gases trapped in the frozen soil stratum are
released. See Katey M. Walter et al., Methane Bubbling from Siberian Thaw Lakes as a Positive
Feedback to Climate Warming, 443 NATURE 71 (2006). The effect leads to a positive feedback loop: as
the greenhouse gases are released, they contribute to warming that melts the tundra faster, which
releases more greenhouse gases more rapidly, and so on. See Katey M. Walter et al., Methane Bubbling
from Northern Lakes: Present and Future Contributions to the Global Methane Budget, 365
PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY A 1657 (2007). Ecologists believe these and
other transformations in the tundra "could be a one-way ticket." John Bohannon, The Big Thaw Reaches
Mongolia's Pristine North, 319 SCIENCE 567, 568 (2008).
[Vol. 24:4
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designers of social systems. Spiders and grasshoppers and plants are
not conscious of their network or of the grassland ecosystem, and
certainly do not purposefully try to alter them. Humans are a different
story. Yet people have long appreciated that they are part of social
systems and that remarkable system properties emerge from their
collective interactions. Adam Smith's theory of the invisible hand of
markets is a theory of emergent properties. 37 It seems implausible
that there would not be many such invisible hands at work throughout
social worlds. Complex adaptive systems theory is aimed at making
the invisible hands of markets and other social systems visible.
One might accept the presence of invisible hands throughout social
life and the value of using complex adaptive systems theory to
understand them better, but nonetheless resist applying complex
adaptive systems theory to legal systems on the ground that the law is
where humans write the rules for other social systems. But this
misses two fundamentals. First, the legal system, as a source of rules
for regulating other social systems, should take into account how
those systems operate. If one wishes to regulate a complex adaptive
social system, one ought to think like a complex adaptive social
system. Second, law, as in the collection of rules and regulations, is
the product of the legal system, a collection of people and
institutions. Law, in this sense, is simply an emergent property of the
legal system the same way prices are an emergent property of
markets.
It defies reason to believe that the legal system would be the one
social world in which invisible hands are not at work. Rather, all of
the ingredients and properties of complex adaptive systems are there
at work in the legal system. As the following chart shows, the legal
system exhibits all of the agent properties of complex adaptive
systems.
37. See BEINHOCKER, supra note 8, at 26, 38; MILLER & PAGE, supra note 10, at 106.
2008l
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Agent Property CAS Theory Legal System Examples
Principles
heterogeneity complex adaptive - legislatures, courts, and agencies
systems consist of a • lawyers and clients
number of different • federal, state, and local
classes of
autonomous agents
deterministic rules the agents interact • courts interpret legislative acts
with and adapt to • legislatures overrule courts
each other according • superior courts reverse or affirm
to deterministic rules lower courts
• legislatures delegate to agencies
• agencies implement statutes
• courts review agency action
• lawyers challenge all of the above
nonlinear the agent interaction • political leadership of legislatures
relationships rules do not produce changes
behavior that is in * new statutes are enacted or old
continuous statutes are amended or repealed
proportionate * new agency heads are appointed
relationships over and change policy direction
time; sharp tipping * courts overrule precedent
points and unexpectedly, but infrequently
discontinuities
frequently occur
network there is high * systems of court appeals
connectivity of connectivity, or * agency hierarchical structure
feedback feedback, between • legislative oversight of agencies
agents, parts, and through hearings and reports
scales of the system, - judicial review of agencies
creating a network of * legislative response to judicial
nodes and channels statutory interpretations
through which * employees move within and
information (energy, between institutions
money, food) flows
Similarly, as the following chart suggests, both the common law
and public law systems exhibit complex adaptive system properties
emerging from the agent interactions.
[Vol. 24:4
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System Property CAS Theory Principles Legal System Examples
emergence and as system scope grows, • the Endangered Species Act
aggregation system behavior (ESA), enacted in 1973, has
emerges from the been amended several times,
aggregation of network implemented through rules
causal chains which and policies of several
cannot be explained by administrations, and
examining any isolated interpreted by courts in
part of the system numerous cases
38
the question "what is ESA
law?" thus cannot be
answered solely by consulting
just the statute, or the cases,
or the policies
path dependence the next state of the * the ESA and most of today's
system depends on the environmental laws were
information that has originally enacted over 25
flowed through the years ago, and many retain
system in all prior states much of their original
structure
- judicial interpretations
continuously build on prior
cases
39
- agencies continuously refine
rules through amendments
and implement through
policies
self-organized as system scale grows, • the common law evolved deep
structure the system tends to doctrinal rules that lent
organize around a set of stability to the system over
deep structural rules that time
lend stability to system
behavior
critical states notwithstanding deep - the common law also
stable structure traits, continuously changes as new
dynamic qualities of the knowledge and new
system (nonlinear circumstances enter the
38. For a thorough overview of the history and implementation of the Endangered Species Act, see
STANFORD ENVTL. L. SOCIETY, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES AcTpassim (2001) and MICHAEL J. BEAN &
MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NAT'L WILDLIFE LAW 193-276 (3d ed. 1997).
39. The classic treatment of path dependence in the law is, of course, found in Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). For modern versions, see Oona A.
Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Change in the Legal System, 86
IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L.
REv. 641 (1996).
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System Property CAS Theory Principles Legal System Examples
relationships, network system40
feedback) lean toward • American property law, for
change at the "surface" example, changed
of the system, so that the significantly from British
system evolves under a property law over time,
"stable disequilibrium" responding to different
set of behaviors, conditions between the two
sometimes near or "on societies and land domains
4
'
the edge of' the chaotic
power law event the distribution of the • the Supreme Court very
distribution "size" of events in the infrequently overrules
system does not exhibit precedent
a binomial normal • a very small fraction (0.025
distribution, but rather percent) of the 4 million
takes on asymptotic judicial opinions reported in
properties with many LexisNexis databases
"small" events and very accounts for over 80 percent
few "large" events of all citations.
42
adaptive resistance as a result of these - congressional efforts to
and resilience internal behaviors, the overhaul the ESA to protect
capacity system as a whole "property rights" have failed
proves resistant to miserably for 20 years
environmental - indeed, few environmental
perturbations and laws have received even
resilient at returning to congressional fine tuning
or near its self-organized since the Clean Air Act
critical state following a Amendments of 1990
perturbation
phase transitions if pushed too far from its ° to repel congressional reform
self-organized critical efforts, Bruce Babbitt, as
state, however, either by Secretary of the Interior in the
a massive perturbation 1990s, engaged in a series of
or by constant pressure administrative reforms,
from less severe dramatically changing the
perturbations, the CAS way the ESA is implemented
could "tip" in a as well as its long-term
40. As Justice Scalia has famously observed, under the common law "changed circumstances or new
knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so." Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992).
41. See John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
519 (1996) (tracing the evolution of American property law with respect to wilderness areas, which
responded to conditions much different from those in Britain that shaped early common law property
doctrine).
42. Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 309, 324-28 (2007).
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System Property CAS Theory Principles Legal System Examples
nonlinear and potentially political status43
irreversible move into a
new set of behaviors
To be sure, showing that complex adaptive systems theory maps
well onto the legal system does not, I confess, prove that the legal
system is a complex adaptive system. But that is not the test to which
the usefulness of complex adaptive systems theory should be put.
Rather, it should suffice to show that the model of complex adaptive
systems provides useful design lessons for the legal system-that if
we think of the law as a complex adaptive system, we are better at
designing law as a system. I turn to that question in the next section.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL SYSTEM DESIGN
By making the invisible hands of physical, biological and social
worlds visible, even if only opaquely, complex adaptive systems
theory has the potential for vastly improving our understanding of
their inner workings and the effects of change on system futures.
Change in social systems is often beyond human control, in which
case how we respond to such external change events could be guided
by complex adaptive systems theory. But in social systems, change
very often is the specific intent of human intervention, in which case
knowing how the system responds to change should be an important
factor in the design of the instrument of change. The problem for
both types of change is that by their very nature, complex adaptive
systems make tinkering an undertaking plagued by uncertainty. Law
is no exception.
43. 1 cover this series of reforms in detail in J.B. Ruhl, Endangered Species Act Innovations in the
Post-Babbittonian Era-Are There Any?, 14 DuKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 419 (2004), and J.B. Ruhl,
Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. U. 367 (1998).
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A. The Challenges of Tinkering with Complex Adaptive Systems
Returning to the example of ecosystems, the story of the spiders
and the grasshoppers speaks volumes about the challenges of
tinkering with complex adaptive systems to produce specific intended
outcomes. In ecosystems, something so small as changing the type of
spider in the species assembly can alter something so large as the
vegetative pattern. Complex adaptive systems generally display this
sensitivity to initial conditions, whereby relatively small changes in
the setup conditions can make a relatively large difference in the
system dynamics. 4
4
How change happens in response to different conditions depends
largely on the feedback it sends to agents in the system. When the
spiders were changed in the grassland ecosystem, the grasshopper
responded using feedback to test new foraging strategies. There were,
of course, a limited number of options available to the grasshoppers
in terms of traits and behaviors to adjust, combinations of which
formed its fitness landscape, showing how well each combination
would fare over time.45 But in testing combinations, the grasshopper
faces conflicting constraints as changing one trait or behavior may on
its own look promising, but may have adverse effects in other
46respects. For example, staying perfectly still might be a good
strategy for avoiding sit and wait spiders, but it also limits access to
food sources.
Change in our grassland ecosystem does not end with the
grasshopper's adaptive move. Say the grasshopper devises a strategy
that balances conflicting constraints and achieves a relatively high
"peak" on its fitness landscape. What will the spiders do then? Of
course the spiders will test new strategies as well, faced with their
own fitness landscape (which the grasshoppers' new strategy has
44. See Levin, supra note 20, at 433 ("[T]he potential for alternative development pathways [for
ecosystems] is enormous.").
45. For an extensive and cogent description of fitness landscapes, see STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME
IN THE UNIVERSE 26-27, 154-67 (1995).
46. See id. at 170 ("[T]he contribution to overall fitness of the organisms of one state of one trait
may depend in very complex ways on the states of many other traits.").
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adjusted) and set of conflicting constraints. And so the arms race of
co-evolutionary fitness landscapes is in play-like Alice in the Red
Queen's land, all species must run in the race just to stay in place.47
The co-evolution of fitness landscapes confounds efforts to design
change in complex adaptive systems with specific intended results.
Consider kudzu and the many other introductions of species humans
have designed to "solve" a "problem" with an ecosystem, only to
have the plan backfire wildly.48 We repeatedly delude ourselves that
we can isolate parts of ecosystems and adjust them without affecting
anything else in the ecosystem, when in fact the irreducibility of
system behavior requires us to take ecosystem-level properties into
account whenever we touch any part of the system.49
Of course, given the complexity of ecosystems, we have no
practical choice but to manage them through their parts as we
perceive them. So we are bound to misfire on occasion and get it
right on others. When we realize we have made a mistake (as we
know we did with kudzu), we often find an irreversibility of system
states forces us to live with the consequences.5" Complex adaptive
systems cannot be rewound and restored to prior states. On the other
hand, when we find to our delight that we have achieved success, as
the grasshoppers might eventually have found in their response to the
new spider regime, we must be mindful of the impermanently
optimizable fitness of complex adaptive systems.5 The arms race of
co-evolving fitness landscapes requires constant adjusting to the
coevolving fitness landscapes. There is no rest for the agents in a
complex adaptive system.
47. Thus Murray Gell-Mann has explained that "[a]n ecological community consists, then, of a great
many species all evolving models of other species' habits and how to cope with them." MURRAY GELL-
MANN, THE QUARK AND THE JAGUAR: ADVENTURES IN THE SIMPLE AND THE COMPLEX 237 (1994).
48. See Peter M. Vitousek et al., Biological Invasions as Global Environmental Change, 84 AM.
SCIENTIST 468 (1996). For a series of articles covering the invasive species issue comprehensively, see
Special Section: Population Biology of Invasive Species, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 24 (2003).
49. Thus the futility, even folly, of employing reductionist methods of study for complex adaptive
systems. See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 10, at 41-42.
50. See KAUFFMAN, supra note 45, at 23.
51. As the late Per Bak put it, "[t]he self-organized critical state with all its fluctuations is not the
best possible state, but it is the best state that is dynamically achievable." PER BAK, How NATURE
WORKS 198 (1996).
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Inherently, therefore, complex adaptive systems exhibit
unpredictable future states.52 A system may be stable and predictable
over some relevant time frame and scale, but it is never entirely
static, and small changes in one condition can lead over time to large
changes in another condition. For example, ecologists know climate
change will change ecosystems, but at present they have only rough
and tentative predictions for how, when, and where. 53 The chance of
accurately predicting all that will change in a particular ecosystem if
global temperatures rise by 20 C is slim; the chance that we could
tinker in that process and thereby ensure a designed outcome is even
more remote.
54
B. Designing Law as a Complex Adaptive System
Law is an enterprise in inducing change in social systems, and
here again the design issues of complex adaptive systems map well
onto the legal system, as shown in the following chart.
Design Issue Effects on CAS Design. Legal System Examples
sensitivity to initial due to feedback, * what if William the
conditions nonlinearity, and Conqueror had lost?
emergence, relatively • what if someone other than
small changes in Bruce Babbitt had been
starting conditions can Secretary of the Interior in
lead to relatively large the 1990s?
differences in system
52. Norman L. Christensen et al., The Report of the Ecological Society of America Committee on the
Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665, 669 (1996) ("[W]ith
complexity comes uncertainty," thus "we must recognize that there will always be limits to the precision
of our predictions set by the complex nature of ecosystem interactions.").
53. See Douglas Fox, Back to the No-Analog Future?, 316 SCIENCE 823 (2007) ("[l]f the climate
changes over the next 100 years as current models predict, surviving species . . . are likely to be
reshuffled into novel ecosystems unknown today.").
54. See Stefan Rahmstorf et al., Recent Climate Observations Compared to Projections, 316
SCIENCE 709 (2007).
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Design Issue Effects on CAS Design Legal System Examples
dynamics
conflicting constraints changes in one system • stricter environmental
on the fitness component to promote regulation has costly
landscape fitness may be limited economic effects
55
by properties of other • market-based solutions risk
system components also hot-spots of pollution
56
designed to promote
fitness
co-evolutionary improvements in • landowners race to develop
fitness landscapes and system A's fitness when they anticipate new
"Red Queen" effects prompt adaptive co- more restrictive regulations57
evolutionary moves in to which local jurisdictions
other systems that could respond by enacting "permit
reduce system A's moratoria"
58
fitness possibilities
under its new
configuration,
prompting yet further
adaptation in system A
irreducibility of because emergence is a ° one cannot understand the
system behavior system scope common law of torts by
phenomenon, system studying one case, or even all
behavior cannot be the cases representing one
understood and doctrine
designed by studying a ° one cannot pinpoint the
single agent or group of provision of the Endangered
agents Species Act (ESA) that
accounts for all the
55. The capital expenditures on pollution abatement required under environmental laws were over $5
billion in 2005 alone, and the operating costs were over $20 billion. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
EcoNoMIcs AND STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, POLLUTIoN ABATEMENT COSTS AND
EXPENDITURES: 2005 (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/ma200-05.pdf. See
generally Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 409-11 (1990)
(describing the costs and benefits of Clean Air Act regulation).
56. The widely acknowledged potential for regulatory pollutant and habitat trading programs to
produce "hot spots" of adverse impact is discussed in general in James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies
and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REv. 607, 638-40 (2000), and more
specifically in connection with climate change policy in Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The
Equity Problem, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 60-61 (2008). See generally Noga Morag-Levine, The Problem
of Pollution Hotspots: Pollution Markets, Coase, and Common Law, 17 CORNELL J. L & PUB. POL'Y
161 (2007).
57. See David Dana, Natural Preservation and the Race to Develop, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 655, 677-95
(1995).
58. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002).
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Design Issue Effects on CAS Design Legal System Examples
program's impacts on
property rights
irreversibility of because the present • repeal of a regulatory law, or
system states system state is a overruling of a precedent,
product of all cannot rewind the world back
information that has to the state that existed just
flowed through the prior to when the law or prior
system to that point in ruling was promulgated
all past states, the
system dynamics
cannot be reversed to
past states, but only
steered into new
directions
approximating where
the past might have led
had different decisions
been made then
impermanently because of co- • the ESA, as powerful as it is
optimizable fitness evolutionary fitness today, stands no chance at
landscape effects, conserving all endangered
superior fitness cannot species in the face of climate
be "locked in" change
permanently and • making the ESA "stronger"
attempts to do so may could make it even less
prove counter- effective as a practical matter
productive over time if property rights
issues flare up
unpredictable future taking all of the • Although we knew a severe
states complex adaptive hurricane would eventually
system properties into land near New Orleans,
account, the future Hurricane Katrina revealed
states and "big" events the lack of sufficient
of a system are not planning and policy structure
predictable over for response
relevant time horizons • If climate change plays out as
expected, what will law look
like in 25 years, and not just
environmental law, but the
law of insurance, contracts,
financing, and other fields
affected by climate change?
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What lessons come out of this exercise? Many are possible, but
three implications seem to me to be most prominent in terms of
designing legal systems and laws. First, we must bear in mind that
our normative goals for law and the legal system are premised on us
believing we have the ability to isolate the "good" from the "bad" in
the social system we hope to manage, when in fact that is impossible.
Complex adaptive systems are not normatively good or bad-we
impute those subjective judgments on them-and there is no way to
extract the "bad" parts from a system without affecting what remains
unpredictably.
Given this, the second lesson is that feedback and conflicting
constraints make unintended consequences 59 and trade-offs60  an
inevitable product of our attempts to do just that-to focus legal
initiatives on parts of a social system. Often we do in fact solve the
problem the targeted part was causing, but because that part was
connected to other parts, some of which we valued as "good," we
cannot cut off the feedback through the network that regulating the
"bad" part is bound to prompt.
This leads to the third and most important lesson-that law should
be designed around the complex adaptive systems model, whereas
generally it is not. Much of environmental regulation, for example, is
based on "front-end" decision making premised on the belief that we
can predict and assess all the consequences of a decision and take
measures to facilitate the positive effects and mitigate the negative
59. Unintended consequences are so common in law that one author has suggested there is a "law"
of unintended consequences in law. See A. A. Sommer, Jr., Preempting Unintended Consequences, 60
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 231 (1997). A classic example is evidence that the restrictions on land
use the Endangered Species Act imposes to protect endangered species have actually prompted habitat
destruction as landowners attempt to prevent species that might come under the statute's protection from
residing on their property, which only exacerbates the need for protection. See Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A.
Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction Under the Endangered Species Act, 46 J.L. & ECON. 27
(2003).
60. Trade-offs also are common in law and policy. See John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener,
Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 1-42 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
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effects.61 As Miller and Page explain, law is not alone in that respect,
as social sciences in general have depended on such simplified
models.
Using traditional tools, social scientists have often been
constrained to model systems in odd ways. Thus, existing models
focus on fairly static, homogeneous situations composed of
either very few or infinitely many agents (each of whom is either
extremely inept or remarkably prescient) that must confront a
world in which time and space matter little. Of course, such
simplicity in science is a virtue, as long as the simplifications are
the right ones. Yet, it seems as though the world we wish to
know lies somewhere in between these extremes.62
Similarly, regulatory structures throughout the administrative state
depend too heavily on simplified front-end models at the expense of
procedures and standards for "back-end" monitoring of and
adaptation to change through time and space.63 I include in that
assertion not just change in the social worlds in which law is
operating, but change induced by the law itself. Law, as a complex
adaptive system, coevolves with the social systems it aims to
regulate, and thereby induces changes on itself. Discounting this
possibility by loading all assessment of change in pre-decisional
stages of regulation invites a stream of unintended consequences.
Complex adaptive systems theory reveals that, while these
consequences may be unanticipated, they should not be unexpected.
Above all else, therefore, the theory of law's complexity counsels us
to design law to think like complex adaptive system.
61. For a thorough review and critique of "front-end" regulatory models, see SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO &
ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2003);
Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, The Missing Perspective, 20(2) ENVTL. F. 42 (2003).
62. MILLER & PAGE, supra note 10, at 5.
63. For an overview of such "adaptive management" models of regulation, see J.B. Ruhl, Regulation
by Adaptive Management-Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SC. & TECH. 21 (2005).
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CONCLUSION
The goal of a theory of law's complexity is not to work around the
complexity of the legal system, but to immerse lawyers and legal
institutions in it by making the invisible hands of law visible. What
questions must we ask to make those invisible hands more visible?
Taking a cue from Simon Levin's list of questions for ecology, 64 I
suggest legal scholars focus on the following lines of research as they
sort through what makes legal systems complex and not just
complicated:
" What patterns exist in the distribution and organization of legal
systems?
" Are these patterns uniquely determined by local conditions or
are they historically and spatially contingent?
" How do legal systems become assembled over social time?
" How does evolution shape legal system properties?
" What are the relationships between legal system structure and
functioning?
" Does evolution of legal systems increase resiliency or lead to
criticality. Does it lead to the edge of chaos?
The general model of law as a complex adaptive system outlined
above draws on examples and anecdotes to begin to answer those
questions by mapping complex adaptive systems theory onto the
legal system. But much more work is needed to build a robust,
durable theoretical framework to guide practical decisions about legal
design across many social contexts. One thrust of theoretical work
will be to dig deeper into applied legal fields to increase the
resolution of the theory. I have devoted attention in that respect to
environmental and administrative law,65 as have others,66 and
64. See Levin, supra note 20, at 435.
65. See J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up
the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 Hous. L. REv. 933 (1997).
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scholars from other fields have begun to apply complex adaptive
systems theory to a wide range of contexts including administrative
law, 67 mediation and alternative dispute resolution,68 bankruptcy,
69
health law,70 international law,71 land use regulation,72 intellectual
property, 73 regulation of the internet, 74 and telecommunications.
75
The other necessary thrust of research will be empirical, with
particular focus on the networks of legal systems 76 and identification
of power law event distributions in the legal system.
77
66. See Gerald Andrews Emison, The Potential for Unconventional Progress: Complex Adaptive
Systems and Environmental Quality Policy, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 167 (1996).
67. See Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J.
913 (2005).
68. See Robert A. Creo, Mediation 2004: The Art and the Artist, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1017 (2004);
Arthur B. Pearlstein, The Justice Bazaar.- Dispute Resolution through Emergent Private Ordering as a
Superior Alternative to Authoritarian Court Bureaucracy, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 739 (2007).
69. See Trujillo, supra note 11; Bernard Trujillo, Self-Organizing Legal Systems: Precedent and
Variation in Bankruptcy, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 483 (2004).
70. See Debra Gerardi, The Culture of Health Care: How Professional and Organizational Cultures
Impact Conflict Management, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 857 (2005).
71. See Mark D. Belcher & James W. Newton, International Legal Development: A Complex
Problem Deserving of a "Complex" Solution and Implications for the CAFTA Region, 12 Sw. J. L. &
TRADE AM. 189 (2006).
72. See John Mixon & Kathleen McGlynn, A New Zoning and Planning Metaphor: Chaos and
Complexity Theory, 42 Hous. L. REV. 1221 (2006); John R. Nolon, Champions of Change: Reinventing
Democracy Through Land Law Reform, 30 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 1 (2006).
73. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Organizational Code: A Complexity Theory Perspective on
Technology and Intellectual Property Regulation, I I J. TECH. L. & POL'Y xiii (2006); Deborah Tussey,
Music at the Edge of Chaos: A Complex Systems Perspective on File Sharing, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 147
(2005).
74. See Susan Crawford, Shortness of Vision: Regulatory Ambition in the Digital Age, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 695 (2005).
75. See Barbara A. Cherry, The Telecommunications Economy and Regulation as Coevolving
Complex Adaptive Systems: Implications for Federalism, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 369 (2007).
76. Theodore Y. Blumoff, On the Nature of the Action-Omission Network, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1001 (2008); Barbara A. Cherry, Maintaining Critical Rules to Enable Sustainable Communications
Infrastructures, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 945 (2008); Gregory Todd Jones, Douglas H. Yam, Reidar
Hagtvedt, & Travis Lloyd, Homogeneity of Degree in Complex Social Networks as a Collective Good,
24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 929 (2008); Daniel M. Katz, Derek K. Stafford, & Eric Provins, Social
Architecture, Judicial Peer Effects and the "Evolution" of the Law: Toward a Positive Theory of
Judicial Social Structure, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 975 (2008); Bernard Trujillo, Randomness and
Complexity in Social Explanation: Evidence from Finance and Bankruptcy Law, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
911 (2008).
77. See Thomas Bak, Power Law Distributions and the Federal Judiciary, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 139
(2006) (filings per district follow a power law); Daniel A. Farber, When the Court Has a Party, How
Many "Friends" Show Up? A Note on the Statistical Distributions of Amicus Brief Filings, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 19 (2007) (amicus brief numbers do not follow a power law); Daniel A. Farber, Earthquakes
and Tremors in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Study of the Dynamics of Interpretation, 89
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Revealing the unpredictable qualities of legal systems through this
kind of research should lead not to a sense of futility for law, but
rather to an understanding of law as a rich and dynamic system that
demands our active participation. Thinking of law as a complex
adaptive system reveals the importance of laws and lawyers as
integral parts of law's fitness landscape, but just as surely reveals the
importance of humility. We will never get the legal system "just
right," at least not for long, but if we are mindful of its properties and
the need for continuous work at living within its stable
disequilibrium, we can hope to keep it fit indefinitely.
MiNN. L. REv. 848 (2005); David G. Post and Michael B. Eisen, How Long is the Coastline of the Law?
Thoughts on the Fractal Nature of Legal Systems, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 545 (2000); Smith, supra note 42.
20081
HeinOnline  -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 911 2007-2008
HeinOnline  -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 912 2007-2008
